An example of a distributed command network tested by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in 2015 | ||||||||
of operations. These command posts are held at a readiness appropriate to the requirement to rapidly deploy and establish a presence; the higher readiness command posts being more focused towards achieving‘ understand’ and‘ coordination’ and the Initial Command Element and MAIN Command Posts focused on the ability to command. On deployment the command posts rely on NATO SECRET as the primary domain; however, as the command posts increase in size and technical capability, the domain is changed to MISSION SECRET which allows Non-NATO partners full access to mission information. The evolving Command and Control review followed the roadmap illustrated in Fig 1. Positioning a HQ within a theatre in a timely fashion, enabling a technical as well as an operational change of control presented the steepest challenge for both staff and enablers, highlighting that HQ ARRC is fortunate to have 1st( United Kingdom) Signals Brigade as an OPCOM unit delivering Combat Command Support and allowing the enablers to be closely integrated into the development, testing and delivery of the new Command and Control concept. |
Brigade used a technical evaluation exercise( Exercise JAVELIN POINT) to assure both the Change of Control process and the technical Information and Communications Services 2 architecture required for HQ ARRC to deploy. As the Brigade’ s first real life look at distributed command, it was imperative to understand the constraints of the network, and how this would drive the dynamics within the HQ. To achieve this, evidence was generated to support the network and training requirements; the size of the bandwidth, the layers of resilience required and the importance of training as we will fight. Through the use of network monitoring tools 3, the Brigade was able to consider the impact of the Battle Rhythm on both Bandwidth and Latency when using Military Satellite Communications. Findings illustrated that when exercising the peak tipped’ 25 Mbps’ bandwidth requirements, and the quality of application performance degraded due to high latency issues. However, it was identified that with a well-rehearsed battle procedure( Initial Command Element, use of conferencing applications and pre-downloading of slides) the extant battle rhythm is viable, re- |
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DEPLOYEX. Prior to Ex | ||||||||
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Element are about | ||||||||
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PLOYEX 1st( UK) Signals |
Figure 1: Developing the ARRC Command and Control Concept |