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Categorisation and Assessment of National Infrastructure within a Hybrid Warfare scenario
CATEGORISATION AND ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN A HYBRID WARFARE SCENARIO
Major Chris Clifford, British Army
The aim of this article is to demonstrate the work that HQ ARRC Engineer Infrastructure Cell is conducting in furthering the HQ’ s and NATO’ s understanding of the assessment of National Infrastructure and the linkages to hybrid / ambiguous warfare.
Background
There is no approved means of assessment of a country’ s national infrastructure in NATO Doctrine. Since 2013, HQ ARRC has used an infrastructure assessment process created by 170( Infrastructure Support) Engineer Group 1 to ensure that a comprehensive assessment is conducted. It is based around a refined definition of Critical National Infrastructure( CNI) and two new descriptions 2, Mission Vital Infrastructure( MVI) and Key Infrastructure( KI) 3:
CNI: Infrastructure assets( physical or electronic), identified by the host nation or NATO, that are vital to the continued delivery and integrity of the essential services upon which the country relies, the loss or compromise of which would lead to severe economic or social consequences or loss of life. Such effects may also have a severe impact on the operation or campaign. Some or all designated CNI may also be categorised by NATO as Mission Vital Infrastructure or Key Infrastructure.
MVI: HN, or Force deployable, infrastructure facilities, systems, sites and networks within the Joint Operations Area upon which the Force rely for deployed capability and / or the destruction or disruption of which, makes the mission untenable.
KI: HN, or Force deployable, Infrastructure facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the HN and / or NATO Force, and the delivery of essential services upon which the HN and / or NATO Force depends. The destruction or disruption of which either singularly or collectively, provide a significant disadvantage to the HN, deployed NATO Forces, Troup Contributing Nations or the mission.
Hybrid Warfare impact on Infrastructure
NATO’ s Capstone Concept 4 states that Hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.
Hybrid warfare can be carried out by both state and non-state actors. The conflict in
Georgia( 2008) and Ukraine / Crimea( 2014) has shown how effective hybrid warfare can be. In both conflicts, the two countries experienced sustained attacks on communications and energy sector infrastructure. Disruption to the communications infrastructure would contribute to interrupting the flow of information, breaking the will of the nation and cohesion of the Government. Attacks against the energy sector have disrupted power and oil supply to contested regions causing problems to the general population. If these sorts of attacks are used in other conflict zones, they would impact on NATO or deployed Force Elements damaging the cohesion of the force or even disrupting the mission. Prolonged, coordinated attacks on a country’ s infrastructure could, in extreme cases, bring about a change of government due to negative public perception. As these sorts of attacks are very difficult to trace, if they occurred to a NATO nation, it would be very hard to prove the instigator and therefore inform the appropriate response.
Continual analysis by J / G2 and Engineer Infrastructure Cell assessing, respectively, the enemy threat, intent and likelihood and the infrastructure vulnerabilities, interdependencies and consequences provides the Commander and the staff with the most up to date Infrastructure Assessment. This subsequently informs the plan and future planning cycles.
Infrastructure Assessment and the Planning Cycle
The Infrastructure Assessment( IA) process is started during the Comprehensive Picture of the Operational Environment‘ Understand’ phase. A comprehensive assessment, provided to the Commander ensures that the HQ is better informed of the risks in their AO and can explain why seemingly unlinked incidents may affect an unrelated area of a country and hence the campaign or operational plan.
The assessment is based around a variety of sources of information, ranging from open source, to military LNOs, to joint and own intelligence means. It should be noted that the IA is not conducted in isolation by the Engineer Infrastructure Cell( Engr Infra Cell) and that liaison through HN LNOs is conducted, where possible, to ensure that the HN have an input and engagement in the planning process.
A full assessment considers nine infrastructure sectors 5 and when time is restricted the four priority sectors to assess are energy, water, transportation and communications.
The aim of the IA is to identify critical entities within each sector and hard or soft links between these entities. Once these infrastructure entities are identified, possible events affecting them are analysed. These are categorised by probability and effect, with the output being a prioritised risk matrix( IA PRM). This product can be used by the command team and planners to; inform courses of action; identify operational and tactical force protection / targeting; prioritise infrastructure development; and identify key leader engagement required by COMARRC and his command team.
Figure 1 shows how the IA process is managed within the planning cycle in HQ ARRC. The lead during the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment( CPOE) phase would be the Engr Infra cell, supported by other branches. Output from this phase is the overall CNI list, which would be revisited throughout the operation. The CNI list is passed to the planners, with the single responsible lead being DCOS Ops, via the G5, G35 and G3 branches. G5, supported Pan-HQ, review the CNI list and designate MVI and KI utilising the CNI list and any other infrastructure being used by the NATO Force. These consolidated lists then form part of the OPLAN prior to handover to G35. Reviewing these lists during different Operational phases is a G5 lead. G35, supported Pan-HQ, during the refinement of the OPLAN and production of the OP ORDER, are responsible for allocating troops to tasks and amended lists as necessary when CONPLANs are created. G3, through the Force Protection WG would review the current lists and recommend changes as necessary, either through the daily FRAGO or via G35 as part of the Joint Coordination Board / Integrated Effects Coordination Board.
Throughout the process, the infrastructure lists need to be continually reviewed in line with changes to the operational situation. Infrastructure on the MVI and KI lists may move between or be removed from them as the use of them by NATO forces changes.
Look Forward
The Infrastructure Assessment process has been briefed at the German / Netherlands Corps Engineer Conference, to the Infrastructure Management Panel and the Force Protection panel of the MILENG Working Group. Most recently it was briefed at the NATO LAND- COM Engineer Conference( NLEC), in Izmir, in Mar 16. Following the NLEC, the process has been accepted as best practice and adopted by LANDCOM for use during their GRP processes. LANDCOM have also encouraged the adoption of the process by the MILENG community across the other HRF-Ls. The concept has support within SHAPE and is being used as the cornerstone of SHAPE’ s development of management of Critical Infrastructure doctrine. Internally, it is proposed that DCOS Ops takes the concept forward in to Exercise TRI- DENT JUNCTURE 16 Crisis Response Planning. Further information on the IA process can be sought from the Engr Infra Cell in HQ ARRC.
About the author:
Major Chris Clifford, British Army, is a Royal Engineers Officer. He has served two tours of Iraq, and holds a MEng in Civil Engineering and a MSc in Military Engineering. He currently serves as the ARRC’ s SO2 Engineer Log / Infra, providing National Infrastructure subject matter expertise to all levels within the HQ.
1 Based on the process in 170( IS) Engr Gp’ s SOP 10.02 Critical Infrastructure Definition. 2 Currently only used within HQ ARRC. 3 MVI and KI are based on the well-known military definitions of Vital Ground and Key Terrain. 4 IMSM-0292-2010, Hybrid threats description and context, May 31, 2010. 5 UK Government 9 Infrastructure sectors are: Energy, Water, Transport, Communications, Emergency Services, Government / Governance, Health, Financial Services and Food.