ARRC JOURNAL
disparate and discreet, but are frequently
coordinated through state driven
agendas. The opportunity to realise
political goals by manipulating the shared
reality is both attractive and substantial. It
comes as a low cost, low risk option with
significant potential. This creates multiple
participants with competing agendas,
who exist in a constant state of conflict.
With no penalties to participation, there
is little requirement to deescalate the
information war.
This has created an environment akin
to Hobbes’ State of Nature, but with
no compelling reasons to enter into a
mutual contract. 6 Governments do seek
to curtail the actions of malign forces in
their immediate vicinity, but only create
localised and temporary solutions. The
actors within the information environment
will then evade, or ignore, the regulation. 7
Thus the opportunities far outweigh the
risks for external participants, giving
them the ability to influence perceptions
and shape reality. 8
In the accelerating
information
environment,
intelligent
engagement will
be multifaceted.
Requiring a layered,
coordinated and pan-
disciplined response,
each challenge must
be treated as unique.
The Military Problem
When the military enters into this
environment it encounters several key
issues in understanding. Firstly, we
use the wrong lexicon. Descriptions of
the strategic, operational and tactical
levels simply do not apply. They lead
to confusion about where interactions
should take place. Any subsequent
attempt to enforce the recognised
military levels inevitably leaves gaps.
Equally the deep, close and rear areas
are not relevant – especially when
our adversaries achieve simultaneous
effects across the spectrum. 9
In addition, the military relationship
with technology must be considered.
Throughout the 20th Century, innovation
was often driven by conflict; engendering
a deep military understanding. The
subsequent advent of the digital age
has seen this relationship invert, with
commercial off-the-shelf purchases
and hired expertise defining how we
operate. This has depleted the instinctive
understanding of the environment in
which the military must now operate.
Equally, it is has become apparent we
cannot apply our conceptual rationale
to our adversaries. Whilst our actions
may seem reasonable to us, they may
be viewed as an act of war by others.
Similarly, our adversaries may deploy
their considerable capabilities, when we
believe no virtual threshold has been
crossed. There are no governing treaties
or universal rules of engagement born of
a comparable conflict.
Furthermore, our structures are ill
suited to encourage understanding
in an asymmetric environment. With
cyber, military deception, STRATCOM
and PSYOPS (amongst others) in
cognitive and structural silos, speed of
response is reduced. In a space that
is simultaneously the domain, medium
and target – this can be fatal. Especially
when our adversaries successfully
promote an integrated approach across
their “information weapons”. 10
Finally,
we
must
redefine
our
understanding of the target audiences.
Combatants, key influencers and
commanders alike are now subjected
to 360-degree digital targeting. Their
partners, local communities and families
all now have a place on the information
battlefield.
Engaging With the
Environment
In
the
accelerating
information
environment, intelligent engagement will
be multifaceted. Requiring a layered,
coordinated
and
pan-disciplined
response, each challenge must be treated
as unique. Resisting the temptation to
answer-by-scenario, the inherent agility
of the environment demands an agile
response. It would be dangerous and
disorientating to do otherwise, as our
adversaries have embraced this idea
before us. 11
Conclusion
This article is a limited think piece,
outlining the author’s understanding of
the information environment. It suggests
that our current familiarity with the
information environment only mimics
understanding and that the constant
acceleration of the environment makes
it an uncomfortable place to operate.
Through the acceptance of this state of
nature, and all the actors in it, success
is possible. The article subsequently
suggests adjusting the lexicon, altering
conceptual rationales and reassessing
the force structure. These changes
may then generate the speed and
agility required to be competitive in the
environment. Finally, the article outlines
thee distinct characteristics of the
information environment to give a flavour
of the challenges to come.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Major Chris Bell is a 12-year veteran of
the British Army and currently serves as
the ARRC’s Psychological Operations
planner. In his previous assignment
he served as the Executive Officer
for the United States Army Training
Establishment’s Cobra Reconnaissance
Team at Fort Irwin, California. Maj. Bell
has served on three separate combat
deployments to Afghanistan. A native of
Durham City, England, Maj. Bell holds
a Bachelor’s Degree in Politics from
Lancaster University.
If the military resolves these intrinsic
issues, it can then focus on understanding
the environment itself. This is the only
logical pathway to intelligent participation.
6 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (London: Andrew Cooke, 1651), 17.
7 Adam Candeub and Mark Epstein, “Platform, or Publisher,” City Journal, May 7, 2018, https://www.city-journal.org/html/platform-or-publisher-15888.html.
8 Mark Laity, “Les apories de la communication stratégique en Afghanistan, “ Politique étrangère, 2013, https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2013-4-page-161.htm.
9 Valery Gerasimov, “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the Country’s Defence in Accordance with the New Statue on the General Staff, Approved by the President of the
Russian Federation,” Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science, 2014.
10 Timothy Thomas, “Information Security Thinking: A Comparison of U.S., Russian, And Chinese Concepts,” Foreign Military Studies Office, July 2001, https://community.apan.org/wg/
tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/240293.
11 Michael Chase and Arthur Chan, China’s evolving approach to integrated strategic deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR1366.html.
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