ARRC JOURNAL
provide a “direct, single-step link between
recognised
situation
classifications
and typical actions, enabling very rapid
decisions to be made.” Adams, Tenney
and Pew also highlight the importance
of schema, in particular for anticipating
specific types of information pertinent
to a situation, which assists individuals
to subconsciously filter out unhelpful
information and actively seek out what
is important. The author posits that the
training frequency for the ARRC staff is
too insufficient to expect them to have
an adequate bank of scripts and schema
from which to deal with the volume of
data being presented to them.
Threats to SA and Decision
Making
Threats to good SA, and a correspondingly
higher probability of making a poor
decision, exist predominantly in the
limitations of the human mind and within
human-machine interfaces. Arguably
the most prevalent threat is attention
tunnelling where an individual locks their
interaction with specific aspects of the
environment and ceases interaction with
others. The risk here, then, is ignorance
of important information that presents
itself. Compelling evidence has shown
that presenting growing volumes of
information to those in complex systems
will increase the risk of this phenomenon,
as individuals attempt to identify the
same ‘critical cues’ amongst a growing
volume of data. Researchers argue that
interaction with the environment can
be better attended to if spread across
all the sensory nodes and not, as an
example, just through the visual band.
Human capacity is bounded, yet what
can be presented to them is theoretically
unbounded. An analytical set of
information requirements, complimented
by
well-designed
human-machine
interfaces, is therefore essential to
avoid overmatching the ability of human
working memory to attending information
presented.
Endsley and Jones found that skewed
mental models resulted in very poor SA
and dangerously poor decisions. Often
cited examples are those in aviation
where pilots used mental models of the
wrong aircraft to process information,
resulting in the wrong perception of
information, the wrong projection of the
future and an inappropriate decision.
24 2012 p.24.
25 Mental models describe an individual’s understanding
of a given system, schema describe the framework of
pre-conceived ideas of the system used to make sense of
new information, and scripts are a sequence of expected
events for a given situation which may occur within the
system. Schema and scripts are generated through
experience of operating within the system.
32
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
In the context of the ARRC, staff must
invest greater effort (training) to become
knowledgeable on the impressive
breadth of multinational capabilities,
which could be task-organised to the
commander from participating nations,
in order to process information within an
accurate mental model.
User Confidence
Linked to threats is uncertainty, which
pervades throughout the SA and decision
making continuum. Doctrine makes
clear that achieving decision superiority
comes with risk and commanders should
never expect to make decisions based
on perfect information, although they
must base decisions on some degree
of certainty and confidence. McCloskey
determined that missing data is arguably
the greatest source of uncertainty,
although the reliability of data is another
notable factor. Research has found that
military commanders request more data
before making decisions if the means to
do so is available, often to the detriment
of timeliness. United Kingdom doctrine
graphically represents this and describes
the notion as ‘decision superiority’, which
is essential in order for the commander
to seize and hold the initiative. It can
be argued that the introduction of
more technology, with more ISR feeds,
may not increase tempo; the author’s
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
reinforce this view.
Conclusions
Researchers are in agreement that SA
is an individual cognitive process and
product, which cannot be generated or
replicated by technology. Moreover, SSA
is accepted as the shared understanding
of the subset of information necessary for
each individual’s task(s) within the team
and is not the sum of individual SA. This
SSA is, therefore, unlikely to be achieved
across a large organisation, such as
the ARRC, and will be limited to smaller
groups, such as the ARRC’s individual
branches. Consideration should also
be given to codifying Endsley’s model
in applicable doctrine or selecting an
alternative in order to better portray
how SA is linked to decision making.
Additionally, as part of our relentless
pursuit of improved SA and decision-
making, we should examine the balance
of investment between technologies and
training; evidence exists that suggests
greater investment in, and frequency of,
training would deliver more benefits.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Major Guy Cheesman currently serves
as the ARRC’s Engineer Plans officer. In
his previous assignment he commanded
the 61st Field Support Squadron Royal
Engineers, 36th Engineer Regiment at
Rock Barracks in Woodbridge, England.
Maj. Cheesman has deployed on a
variety of operations in Sierra Leone,
Iraq, Afghanistan and Cyprus and he
holds a Master’s Degree in Battlefield
Technology from Cranfield University.
Figure 2 – Risk Appetite and Information Superiority
26 Human Factors Journal 1995 p.88.
27 Endsley & Jones 2012 p.33.
28 Rafferty, Stanton & Walker, Safety Science 2013 p.64.
29 2012 p.39-40.
30 UK MoD 2013, para 315.
31 1996 pp.195-196.
32 Lalbakhsh, Sohrabi and Fesharaki 2009, Robertson 2014.
33 Kott 2008, Bates 2010 p.8.
34 Troop Commander 26 Engr Regt on Op TELIC 6, BGE/
IO for 1 PWRR BG on Op TELIC 8, Senior Watch Officer
(SWO) for I and II Marine Expeditionary Force, United
States Marine Corps, Regional Command (South West)
Nov 11 - May 12.