READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
Ex NOBLE JUMP 1 and 2 2 as the means
to further develop the NRF concept. HQ
ARRC also supported the continuation
training of JFC-NP during Ex TRIDENT
JOUST. From these we identified three
key areas of development:
• Deployment
Under the control of
JFC-NP 3 , the NOBLE JUMP 17 series
of exercises rehearsed, for the first
time, the procedures and alerting
concept for all forces designated as
the NRF 17. Subsequently, using an
amended response plan to shape the
deployment, Ex NOJP 2 enabled the
first deployment of elements of the
VJTF(L) to the Alliance’s south-eastern
flank, supported by HQ MND-SE. This
was aided significantly by the early
deployment of the core-staff element
from the JLSG (HQ ARRC). The
exercise validated the NATO Command
Structure’s ability to rapidly deploy a
ready and capable spearhead. It also
provided a better understanding of the
amalgamated challenges created by
multiple nations, deploying by multiple
means 4 , involving transit through
multiple countries. Once in the JoA,
HQ ARRC rehearsed the transfers of
authority while MND-SE (supported by
NFIU ROU and BGR and the Hellenic
Movement Control Centre) controlled
the RSOM. The inward movement
of force elements over twelve days
provided a suitably complex scenario
for MND-SE and the NFIUs, allowing
them to develop their understanding
of their role throughout RSOM. It
also confirmed the importance of
understanding how the NRF uses Host
Nations and the associated liaison
requirements. The exercise enabled
the development of the relationships
and processes between the JLSG and
the regional HQs. It also enabled the
LCC HQ to rehearse the deployment
of its Forward Coordination Element
and practice distributed command from
its permanent HQ in Innsworth, UK.
Operationally and conceptually the
exercise projected active deterrence
and concept validation while building
the capacity of MND-SE and NFIU
ROU and BGR.
• Risk Management There is value in
identifying and managing risks to the
NRF effectively so they can be reported
upon as part of routine procedure.
Their utility is also realised if captured
in the operational planning process.
It became clear
that there were a
number of risks to
the NRF which were
neither
captured
nor being managed.
To address this, HQ
ARRC developed
a risk register to
enable this HQ
and
others
to
understand
the
implications of risks
to the NRF and
identify ways to
mitigate them.
The Spanish 7th Infantry Brigade handed over the VJTF(L) role
• 2* Level of Command
Coherent command and control is
essential and this year confirmed that a
Divisional level of command is needed
for the NRF. The LCC HQ command
and control of 29 (Land) divisional troop
force elements is unsustainable. In
addition, a layer of complexity is added
when a LCC HQ attempts to coordinate
the battle rhythm between the campaign
planning of a JTF HQ and the execution
through tactical actions of the Land
Component. As an Operational/higher-
tactical HQ, the LCC must be able to
develop and refine plans up to 96 hours
in advance although its battle rhythm
needs to also elongate to synchronise
with the higher HQ. With an intermediate
2* HQ, the complexity created between
3* and 1* HQs is mitigated.
Recommendations
Following our year as the NRF(L), HQ
ARRC has identified a number of key
areas for further development to support
NRDC-ITA as they take on the mantle for
2018:
• Larger Exercising Forces Not all
VJTF(L) forces participated in Ex NOJP
2 and only small elements from the other
Components deployed. Although this
year we increased the complexity for the
deployment phase, to further develop the
mechanics of a large scale deployment
(and the message that it sends), future
deployments could be larger in scale
and include more elements from the
Component Commands and Forward
Presence. Additionally, a table top
exercise that included the whole NRF
would benefit future planning and
help inform the process of adjusting
the European theatre to enable rapid
deployment of the largest force.
• Coherent
Narrative A coherent
narrative that links all NATO exercise
activity (and other national or bi-
lateral exercises) will help cohere
our STRATCOM messaging. Crisis
Response Planning periods (using the
same ACO-directed exercise scenario)
could also align across the other
Components, ensuring collaborative
planning (up, down and sideways) to
maximise the value of training. Coherent
exercise, training and communication
objectives could be issued to HRFs to
ensure that they are linked through all
NRF exercise activity. The same link
could flow to national exercise activity
to achieve a fully holistic preparation.
• Training Complexity and Realism
Further investment and development
of the ISR , Influence and CMI
training environment is required. We
should also ensure that we replicate
reality (Future Character of Conflict
complexity) within the training construct
and
maximise
opportunities
for
experimentation activities. Wherever
possible, NRF exercises should be led
with an operational (J5/3) approach,
rather than a training (J7) approach.
They should also be Joint by nature,
owned by ACO and drive innovation at
every level of command.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Maj Alex Michael is currently SO2 Policy
in the G7 branch at HQ Allied Rapid
Reaction Corps. Previously he worked
as the exercise planner for Ex NOBLE
JUMP.
1 New in-place force enablers.
2 Ex NOBLE JUMP 1 = AERTEX, Ex NOBLE JUMP 2 = ALERTEX followed by DEPLOYEX.
3 HQ ARRC G7 provided the Co-OPR for this exercise.
4 Eight countries by road, rail, air and sea.
5 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
6 The degree of complexity, however, needs to be coherent with the scope (level of ambition) of the exercise
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
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