ARRC Journal 2018 | Page 66

ARRC JOURNAL a staff capable of critical and creative thinking. The aforementioned benefits work to support the overarching value of deception, which is contributing to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The Challenges of Deception Despite the benefits, deception does come with a range of challenges; not least of which is that not all deem deception as an acceptable tactic, opposing it on political or ethical grounds, and viewing it as ‘cheating’. Yet deception is a legitimate military activity, belonging to the ruses of war, but must comply with the Law of Armed Conflict. National caveats often apply as well, for example not misleading a nation’s own public. Unlawful deception includes: 1. Feigning surrender to lure the enemy into a trap 2.  Misuse of protective signs and symbols to injure, kill, or capture the enemy Despite its challenges, deception is a beneficial endeavour and should be planned centrally to maintain operational security (OPSEC) and continuity from the strategic to tactical level. 3.  Using an ambulance or medical aircraft marked with the Red Cross or Red Crescent to carry armed combatants, weapons, or ammunition to attack or elude the enemy. Another challenge with deception is the perception that it is a waste of time and resources and, therefore, not pragmatic. This is a plausible counter on a number of fronts – the diminishing size of many nations’ armed forces, the increasing capability of ISTAR technology, and the near real-time access to information through news and social media. Even Clausewitz described deception as having greater risks than value and suggested against its use. In truth, deception does take time and resources however, history is full of examples where deception helped achieve military 66 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS objectives more efficiently than other options. Deception can save resources and lives while causing the enemy to waste combat power with inappropriate or delayed actions. Nevertheless, in a NATO operation, ensuring a deception plan meets national caveats, does not offend certain states’ sensitivities to the topic, and is perceived as a worthwhile endeavour is challenging. Equally challenging is generating the desired enemy reaction. Deception targets the adversary decision makers, those with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the goal of our deception plan. The entire deception operation focuses on a key individual, so understanding how that individual perceives events and the conduits through which information flows to him are further challenges to effective deception. The enemy may react to the deception plan in a totally unexpected way, and in doing so jeopardise the success of the operations the deception plan was intended to benefit. Further, the enemy intelligence staff and other conduits to the target may filter, misinterpret or misrepresent the deception messages before they reach the enemy decision maker. Protecting the qu