ARRC Imjin Magazine Winter 25 | Seite 12

ARRC NEWS

ARRC Provost Marshal Office

NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence Operational Detention Forum 2025
Maj Richard Schutte
In October 2025, the NATO Operational Detention Forum convened in Bydgoszcz, Poland, bringing together members of the NATO Military Police( MP) community, including sovereign MPs and NATO Provost Marshal Offices. Key stakeholders such as the International Committee of the Red Cross( ICRC), legal experts, the Ukrainian Army, charitable organisations, and medical personnel contributed to the event’ s depth. Over three days, participants examined doctrine and lessons from recent NATO exercises and ongoing conflicts on managing Prisoners of War( PW), criminal detainees, and security internees— collectively referred to as Captured Persons( CPERs). Discussions also addressed related topics, including dignified management of the dead, with insights from the Falklands War and the experiences of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel who survived Russian captivity.
Lessons from Ukraine
The forum featured presentations from two Ukrainian military personnel who had been held as PW by Russian forces. One, a member of the Azov Battalion, and the other, captured during the defence of Mariupol, shared harrowing accounts of captivity lasting 12 – 18 months. Their experiences highlighted the dual position of NATO forces as both captors for the enemy personnel but also and the loss of our own forces into captivity.
These accounts were followed by discussions on Ukraine’ s reintegration efforts for its Armed Forces personnel and the challenges of addressing physical and mental health issues post-captivity. A session on prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia underscored the strategic impact of Geneva Convention compliance. Ukraine’ s has experienced occasions of PW who have been captured and exchanged on parole on multiple occasions since 2014. Although against the Geneva Convention to redeploy personnel after being paroled, the example of multiple surrenders does illustrate that the enemy resolve to fight is weakened when lawful capture is known to follow.
Lessons from History
A review of conflicts from World War II, the Falklands war and Afghanistan revealed a recurring oversight: forces consistently underestimate, under-plan, and under-resource CPERs operations.
Recent NATO and national exercises have shown little improvement in addressing this historical shortfall.
The logistical and force requirements for large-scale CPERs operations are significant. It is an understandable challenge to divert any forces from their primary task to guard CPERs along the pathway rearwards. This is especially the case for combat forces. However, history demonstrates that failure to plan and resource guard forces before conflict merely postpones the decision to a time of far greater inconvenience. It is important to recognise that what may seem a weakening of the physical component of fighting power, it can strengthen the moral component by preserving international support, maintaining troop morale, and eroding the enemy’ s will to fight.
In an era of increasing digitisation and autonomous lethality, NATO must uphold its ethical high ground. Preserving the humanity of adversaries during conflict has long-term implications for post-war stability. Historical instances where CPERs have been dehumanised are sadly easy to find and often a source of national shame. The forum concluded that the MP community must continue to generate exercises that test forces for the realistic and uncomfortable reality of CPERs. Guards and other supporting troops must be resources with personnel from current and resourced ORBATs and not imaginary ones. Lastly the national importance of CPERs must be given due regard when planning and not taken at risk.
12 WINTER 2025 the imjin @ HQARRC NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps @ HQARRC