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Arctic Yearbook 2015
local and national level by coherent policy management. At the international level, the Arctic Council
and the forthcoming Arctic Coast Guard Forum will play important roles in combatting institutional
uncertainty pertaining to emergency response in the Arctic region, by harmonizing policy and linking
decisions.
Taking a closer look: institutional uncertainty
The eight Arctic states are all parties to the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime
Search and Rescue in the Arctic (hereafter referred to as SAR Agreement4) negotiated under the auspices
of the Arctic Council, and are therefore bound to respond to a search and rescue situation in
accordance with the articles of that Agreement. However, the language of the treaty is deliberately
vague: an “adequate and effective search and rescue capability” is left undefined, as is the nature of
the promptness that is required in communications between parties. While tasking states with the duty
to respond, the Agreement leaves a great deal of latitude. The case study of the Oryong 501, a South
Korean trawler that sank in the Bering Sea under high seas in November 2014, serves to demonstrate
that national SAR capacity and culture varies in ways that create institutional uncertainty and
contribute to the wickedness of emergency response in the Arctic.
On November 30, 2014, the Oryong 501 took a large wave onboard while hauling in pollock, and water
flooded the boat’s storage chambers.5 The captain ordered the crew of 60 to abandon ship nearly 109
miles away from land. The incident occurred in waters delegated to Russian SAR responsibility under
the 2011 Agreement, but near to the border with the US zone of responsibility.
According to reports and interviews, the designated Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator, the
Russian Kamchatka Border Guard Directorate (KBGD), did not immediately respond to the incident.
The US Coast Guard 17th District Command Center was notified of the incident by Oryong 501’s
emergency locator beacon alert signals and immediately contacted the Russian Rescue Coordination
Center in Vladivostok (Honings 12/19/14). Although the US Coast Guard offered assistance, Russia
did not accept help until the next morning, December 1st, 2014. Throughout the search, Russia did
not provide a base or aircraft support to aid what should have been an international search and rescue
effort (Klint 2014).
Extensive assets were utilized throughout multiple search efforts by the United States Coast Guard
and the South Korean Navy (Miller 2014). The US Coast Guard deployed US Coast Guard Cutter
Alex Haley, US Coast Guard Cutter Munro, several C-130 Hercules aircraft based out of Air Station
Kodiak, a MH-65 Dolphin helicopter from Kodiak, and two SAR planners from Juneau to assist South
Korean Navy P-3 aircrews in Anchorage (Honings 12/15/14). US assets were requested to divert
from their original missions to support the search. Additionally, Good Samaritan vessels played a large
role in search efforts and the rescue of seven survivors. Of Oryong 501’s 60-crewmembers, seven
survived, 27 crewmembers were recovered deceased, and 26 people remain missing in the waters. A
week after the incident, the South Korean Navy aircrafts relieved the US Coast Guard of aeronautical
searches. During its involvement in the search and recovery efforts, the US Coast Guard conducted
24 searches, covering more than 4,576 square miles (US Coast Guard).
Large-Scale Disaster Response in the Arctic: Are We Ready?