American Valor Quarterly Issue 6 - Spring/Summer 2009 | Page 36

recalibrate is worse. Had advice been sought in Washington from
those still living who experienced Vietnam, the decision-makers
would have learned that nation building is a long, difficult, uncertain
and expensive process. They would have learned that terrorists
acting alone or in concert can be a significant impediment to
progress, witness the effectiveness of the Viet Cong. Nation
building requires—then and now—a committed infrastructure,
defense forces, economic and agricultural development. This is not
an inclusive list. Vietnam had the advantage of social solidarity,
compared to the fractured alliances of Iraq. Could anything be
more obvious when planning for the post-combat phase (itself
an ironic expression of cruel
proportions)?
We made a mistake of gradually
increasing our forces in
Vietnam, hoping the more
pressure we applied, the sooner
our enemies would cry uncle.
When we halted the bombing
of North Vietnam, this was
acknowledgment that pain may
destroy facilities but not fracture
solidarity. General Colin Powell,
as chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, codified this experience
in The Powell Doctrine.

effectively. President Thieu was an attentive protégé.
Consider that General Abrams had served with distinction in
World War II and the Korean War. He understood warfare from
the bottom up, without illusion. We went into Iraq without that
reservoir of experience. Those who had it were ignored, by all
accounts, pushed aside by wishful thinkers.
We learned in Vietnam that gradualism doesn’t work, defeating
terrorism is a long, difficult task, and working with a strong central
government is critical to success. More than anything else, the
people who live in the country
must share a common vision.
We went into Baghdad blind, as
Jim Fallows reported in a classic
article published by The Atlantic
Monthly, January/Febr uary
2004. Until more evidence is
put on the table, we may depart
as blind as we arrived.

Charles Krohn is promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel at Fort
Stewart, Georgia, by Major General Vaught.
Assisting is Krohn’s wife, Jeannie.

This is not my wish. But it may
be the inevitable consequence
of inexperience, arrogance
and historical ignorance. The
Iraqis will ultimately side with
an obvious winner. For better
or worse, we and the world will
have to live with that decision.

Our attack of Iraq in March
2003 was made with minimal
forces deemed necessary. This
was a conscious decision of the Secretary of Defense to ignore The Lost Battalion of Tet: Breakout of the 2/12 Cavalry at Hue
Powell’s guidance, and his senior advisors apparently supported by Charles Krohn is available in a Pocket Star edition and at
this approach. At least none of them resigned in protest. As late bookstores nationwide.
as June 2003 the official position was that there was no insurgency,
until the facts (and General Abizaid’s statements) made denial
untenable. Meanwhile, Baghdad crumbled and burned.
AVQ
After he left office as Secretary of State, Powell captured our failure
with the observation that we never imposed our will on Iraq. Yet,
this is what armies in contact with the enemy are supposed to
do as Mission One. While serving as Secretary of State, Powell
tried to participate in war planning, but was apparently rebuffed
by others in the White House and Pentagon. Powell was one of
the few figures then serving who experienced the war in Vietnam
and Desert Storm.

AMERICAN VALOR QUARTERLY - Spring/Summer 2009 - 37

Courtesy of Charles Krohn

When we finally got around to doing things right in Vietnam, it
was after the departure of General William C. Westmoreland and
the ascendancy of General Creighton Abrams and his co-partner,
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. When they finally departed,
each had served in Vietnam for about six years. President Nixon
deferred to their military and political judgment, and he was well
served by his patience. Over time, Abrams and Bunker learned
from their in-country experience and applied those lessons