American Valor Quarterly Issue 6 - Spring/Summer 2009 | Page 32

of 2004 and the insurgency began to grow and al Qaida became more powerful, it proved inadequate. In June 2004, we took our military structure, which had been a three-star in command, and replaced it with a three-star responsible for tactical operations in Iraq and a four-star to work alongside our ambassador in Iraq. So we completely revamped the way we were approaching the problem, and had to learn as we went. Yes, I was not happy with the initial planning, done by the military. I think there was a lot of planning done for the stability and reconstruction phase, but it just did not go very well. Some of which, I think I could have anticipated, not just looking back but at the time, and there were some things that I probably should have done, or at least advice that I should have given that might have made it a little better. Roberts: Final question. At the end of the book, you advance some policy recommendations for reforming our national security system. Can you summarize some of those? Administration when I served as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It worked pretty well in Plan Columbia, which dealt with the drug problem in Columbia. President Clinton appointed Tom Pickering, who was Under Secretary of State, to serve in that position. That was a much simpler task than Iraq or Afghanistan, or the Global Insurgency, but one that worked fairly well because we knew who was in charge and who had the authority, as well as who would be held accountable if things did not go well. We never quite had that for the issues that we were involved with when I was Chairman. Jim, it has been great being with you, and while there are a lot of lessons learned in this book, obviously and in the end it is all about the troops. One reason I was so privileged to serve as Chairman is that you get so much energy from the folks out there doing their jobs day in and day out. I never went to Afghanistan or Iraq without coming home more optimistic and pumped up, because I saw these people out there doing everything they could to get the mission done. They are the ones who cause our success, not those of us in Washington. While a lot of what I talk about in the book is what happens at the highest level of government, hopefully we represented our troops well, because in the end, they are the ones who get the job done. General Myers: You bet. Well, it all hinges on the fact that I think we have a lack of a comprehensive strategy to deal with extremism. So I talk about what I call the “Global Insurgency” that we see with violent extremism around the globe and then a strategy that we ought to develop and how we ought to deal with it. It basically involves using all instruments of national power – not Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National predominantly the military instrument, but all instruments. Then I Security by General Richard B. Myers is available from Threshold Editions talk about what you are asking about, which is how do we organize and at bookstores nationwide. to do this? One of my frustrations as Chairman was the President AVQ would say, “Okay, go forth and do this mission.” It is a mission that requires not only the Department of Defense but Department of State, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, many other departments and agencies in our government. But there is no way to harness all that power. Several think tanks around Washington have been working on this problem, people a lot smarter than me. Basically, we are organized by the National Security Act of 1947, which came about due to our experiences in World War II. In a facetious way, we are perfectly organized to fight World War II. Now, we are a little better because over time we have modified the National Security Act, but I don’t think we are well enough organized for the threats that we will face in the 21st Century. My proposal is that we have more of a temporary arrangement to organize for major issues such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Some people are calling for a fundamental review, which would require not only the executive branch but also the legislative branch to come to terms on this. I think that might be too difficult, however. My solution would be simpler, and allow us to put people in charge who would have the responsibility to carry out the policy of the U.S. government and can then be held accountable. We never really had that for Iraq or Afghanistan, or the Global War on Terror (which I call the “Global Insurgency). You might say, “Well, it’s Rumsfeld,” but he never had the authority to tell the other departments and agencies what to do. He was held accountable and I think in some cases, mistakenly so. The President cannot be the one person responsible for the execution of this, either. My solution is for a position that the President can appoint at the Cabinet level who would have the proper authority and be held accountable. I have seen it before in the Clinton AMERICAN VALOR QUARTERLY - Spring/Summer 2009 - 33