American Valor Quarterly Issue 2 - Spring 2008 | Page 34

Pell: Did you make immediate contact with Karzai’s forces?

ourselves faced in a giant convoy of Taliban coming after us.
After that fight was over, that was when Karzai realized that he
actually did need an army. So my team found itself at one point
all alone because our guerillas abandoned us; the nine men of my
team were sitting outside of town in a couple of pickup trucks
directing American air strikes against somewhere between 500
and 1,000 men that were coming to seize the town we were
holding. This was near the town of Tarin Kowt.

Maj. Amerine: Yeah, there were actually two steps to this. Initially
we flew down to Pakistan, and we began some of our planning
there. And when we infiltrated, we infiltrated to this town to the
west of Tarin Kowt in Oruzgan Province. That is where we linked
up with what few men Karzai had. At the time, on the ground,
you only had about a dozen guys that met us, but later we figured
Pell: The goal of the campaign, from what I understand, was to
we had a force of somewhere around 40 or 50 guys.
retake Tarin Kowt and then strengthen their stronghold in
Pell: And what were your impressions of him?
Kandahar?

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Maj. Amerine: Hamid Karzai speaks English fluently, almost Maj. Amerine: The goal of the campaign was to start in Oruzgan,
with a slight British accent. He’s a very intelligent man, and a very the birthplace of the Taliban movement, to seize Oruzgan, and
then make our way down to Kandahar where
literate man. When you speak to him, you feel
we would force the Taliban regime in Kandahar
like you are speaking to a statesman or at least a
to surrender. Kandahar at the time was really
scholar of some kind. He is very insightful and
the capital of the Taliban, not Kabul. But, that
very intelligent. I had to figure out whether or
was where Karzai and I had a bit of a
not whether I trusted him, and he had to figure
disagreement in terms of what it would take.
out whether he trusted me and my men.
He viewed it as really a series of negotiations
and nothing more, and I viewed it as a
And so it was almost like we had to open up to
negotiation to be accompanied by an iron fist.
each other immediately; there wasn’t time for
So when we got on the ground and were told
any games. So I felt like I got to know him to
that the capital of Oruzgan Province, Tarin
the point where I trusted him, that I trusted the
Kowt, had risen up, inviting us to come take
insights and the intel that he was providing us in
the town, we did it with about 50 guerillas and
terms of what we would be doing in Southern
my team of nine guys, and that was all we had.
Afghanistan. And I think he likewise trusted us
that we were going to do our best with him.
He was always concerned as to whether or not Major Jason Amerine as portrayed in Pell: But this convoy was marshaled to come
we were going to abandon him, given the U.S. the America’s Army video game - the take it back?
official video game of the United
history in the region, and that was something
States Army. Maj. Amerine is one of Maj. Amerine: Right, there was a convoy that
that all I could do was assure him that my team
would do its best to live up to all of our four of the Army’s present day heroes was then marshaled from Kandahar to come
to appear as a character in the game.
north and to seize Tarin Kowt from us. So as I
obligations to one another throughout this
say, within 72 hours we didn’t have any guerilla army to speak of,
campaign. And in the end, we did.
and even then, as soon as the convoy came within sight of Tarin
Pell: But his intelligence and achievements aside, did he have any Kowt, the guerillas took off and ran, leaving my team to take
inkling toward any military tactics?
care of the situation themselves.
Maj. Amerine: Karzai had no military background whatsoever,
and that was actually one of the more difficult things from the
beginning. He didn’t believe we actually needed to raise an army,
or believe that there would be any kind of combat involved in
the campaign. He really saw it more as a matter of him negotiating
with the tribal belt to get them to roll over and surrender. So my
team’s role was to show symbolic support to him and he didn’t
see it going much beyond that. In fact, he didn’t want my team to
go in initially. And this was something that I just had to make
clear to him; that the Taliban were not going to just roll over and
die. This was going to get bloody. And I don’t think I got that
across to him. It was one of those things that we just agreed to
disagree, but he said that he would form an army. My team got
on the ground on November 14, and on November 17 we found

Pell: Which was done largely by air strikes you called in?
Maj. Amerine: Right, there were two phases to the fight. My
team had found this just incredible ridgeline outside of town,
with an enormous valley from which to engage the Taliban when
they came up on the attack. And at that point we had about 2530 guerillas with us. The Taliban convoy came to us exactly when
and where we expected, and the guerillas took off and ran. The
problem was that the guerillas had the trucks, and my team didn’t.
So all we could do was retreat with them back into Tarin Kowt.
When we got back to Tarin Kowt, we told Karzai what had
happened. He was pretty surprised to see us so soon—we told
him we were taking the trucks and heading back out to keep up
the fight, and for him to send all the men he could. So my team

American Valor Quarterly - Spring 2008 - 34