The PANAFRICAN Review
the little popularity Lungu had , ultimately leading to the end of his reign as the president of Zambia .
When the PF government came to power in 2011 , Zambia ’ s external debt was $ 1.9 billion USD . In ten years , it rose to more than 12 billion USD , with the IMF sceptical about extending any further loans to Zambia for fear that the country ’ s leadership might use the money to service its debt to China . To make matters worse , in November 2020 , Zambia became the first African country to default on foreign debt during the coronavirus pandemic . This ignominious distinction was a psychological shock that prompted voters to show up in big numbers to express their dissatisfaction with Lungu ’ s governance . Undoubtedly , these circumstances will become an epitaph of Lungu ’ s legacy .
The power of Youth Vote
There is however a silver lining to the predicaments faced by Zambians . For instance , the campaign to keep Lungu in power was also laced with indecorous tribal rhetoric , not directly by Lungu himself , but by acolytes such his running mate Nkandu Luo and Chishimba Kambwili , a political yoyo who , unfortunately , commands widespread attention . But with the current youth unemployment rates , the Zambian youth are no longer persuaded by old voting tactics such as tribal baiting . They want a government that delivers good returns , and , after Lungu ’ s disastrous and chaotic presidency , the youth decided to try something else . Almost a year before the recent election , I wrote a piece in which I celebrated an upside to Zambia ’ s dire situation , highlighting the activism of the youth and arguing that “ Zambian youth have become increasingly vocal , with some of them seemingly courting arrest as they go undeterred in voicing what they justifiably resent in the current government .”
A seasoned politician , HH took advantage of the prevailing dissatisfaction and managed to win the support of Zambia ’ s voters , mostly the youth who form the bulk of the country ’ s electorate . Through his interactive usage of Twitter and Facebook , HH became a personable option for Zambians , in contrast to Lungu , who had become highhanded and generally anti-people . HH ’ s adoption of the moniker of “ Bally ” ( meaning father ) gave his campaign a casual appearance that is in tandem with a social media savvy voting bloc . The election could partly yet aptly be dubbed a social media success , a loud rejoinder to detractors who vilified HH ’ s United Party for National Development ( UPND ) as a “ social media party .”
What ’ s next for Zambia ?
It is noteworthy that after 1991 , political parties in Zambia , apart from Fred M ’ membe ’ s Socialist Party , are usually breakaway movements from more established parties . Thus , they typically espouse the same ideologies , if at all , with marginal differences . The difference between HH and Lungu was not essentially ideological , and the two did not have any marked differences in vision . Indeed , the fact that the UPND is urging Zambians to read the party manifesto is an indirect acknowledgement that the overwhelming support that the party enjoyed was not necessarily centred on people ’ s understanding of their vision . What seemed to work for HH was highlighting the blemishes of the PF administration while cultivating an image of a more decent politician . The recent election has created goodwill on the part of Zambians towards their government , and HH would do well to honour his campaign promises such as practising ‘ clean ’ governance , combatting debt , ending the violence of party cadres who have been a law unto themselves , and ending the allegations of tribal stereotyping that has dogged his political career . The lessons of 1991 , 2011 and 2021 , when incumbents were resoundingly defeated , should be a lesson that he has taken charge of a country of a demanding citizenry who will not hesitate to remove him from office should he fail to measure up to their expectations .
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