racy are ECOWAS leaders talking about ? One that empowers the people , or one that serves special interests and allows bad governance to fester and to remain unaccountable ?
France ’ s blindness
Of all protagonists in the crisis unfolding in Mali , France is set to lose the most . Its concerns are frivolous and its behaviour counterproductive . In fact , France ’ s talking points in the media convey such contempt for Malian authorities that they fuel anti- France sentiments in the country and the region . It ’ s simple : if one were determined to lose the influence France enjoys in that part of the world , they would adopt a similar attitude .
For one thing , any suggestion that France ’ s behaviour in Mali is driven by concerns for democracy invariably leads to uneasy questions about France ’ s open support for the Transitional Military Council in Chad – led by Mahamat Idriss Déby , son of the late Idriss Déby – which took over after the sudden demise of that country ’ s leader on 20 April 2021 . Here , French authorities and their European partners both considered that stability was of the utmost importance and that respect for the constitutional order was a secondary issue . Thus , their rejection of Mali ’ s demands for time to build conducive security and administrative environment for elections exposes ulterior motives .
For another , framing the issue , as French authorities do , in terms of French soldiers ’ sacrifices for the well-being of the people of that region through counter-terrorism operations leads to the kind of argument that keeps going in circles and that France cannot win . Indeed , if gratitude to France is what is expected from Malian authorities and if such gratitude should prompt them to yield to France ’ s demands , then how should Africans perceive France ’ s lack of gratitude to Malians and West Africans who paid the ultimate sacrifice for the liberation of France during World War II ? Such an argument can only revive old grievances . It also raises questions as to whether French authorities are willing to acknowledge their overwhelming responsibilities in the security crisis unfolding in the Sahel region . After all , this crisis is the direct consequence of France ’ s intervention in Libya , which not only led to the collapse of that country ’ s institutions but also armed anyone opposed to Gaddafi back then , including the Islamist militants who are now creating havoc in Libya ’ s neighbouring countries .
Clearly , the concern for democracy and the sense of sacrifice are not the adequately nuanced lenses with which to look through this quagmire . There is , however , one part that is said loudly and which allows us to grasp the extent of France ’ s frivolous concerns ; it is the main reason that has led to the current confrontation between the two countries . For France , Russia is the elephant in the room , the intruder grazing in France ’ s backyard . In the eyes of the former colonial power , inviting Russia to participate in the counter-terrorism operations in Mali is the real crime committed by Malian transitional authorities . This attitude is nothing new . France has had a similar confrontation with the Central African Republic . So far , it has lost that battle ; and it stands to lose again if the attitude , which consists in having the last word on who is and who is not invited to operate in what France considers its spheres of influence , persists .
Russia ’ s presence also explains why the same media , which cheered the Arab Spring , has unquestionably adopted France ’ s talking points around the presence of Russian mercenaries in Mali . From the West ’ s perspective , military coups d ’ état against “ democratically elected leaders ” can only be accommodated if they don ’ t change the status quo as far as the West ’ s control over Africa ’ s interactions with the rest of the world is concerned . Keeping this fact in mind helps us understand France ’ s erratic behaviour when dealing with an ever-changing geo-political environment in Africa , where bilateral partnerships with diverse actors , such as Middle Eastern powers , China and Russia , provide more options for African countries and allow them to escape the control of their self-appointed tutors .
Meanwhile , Malian authorities , through their minister of foreign
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