sentially backwaters in terms of policy , making them far removed from the real decision-makers in the centre of government , with their industrial policy documents gathering dust . The typical Ministry of Finance and Development Planning officer , much less Minister , still doesn ’ t show much interest in an export-led industrial policy that can bring to life the ‘ real economy ’ vision they have for their nation or acknowledge that fiscal policy and monetary policy – let alone trade , labour , TVET , land and investment policy – should all follow its lead . I ’ ll give a personal example : when I worked with the government of a particular country for 3 years , the Minister of Finance showed no interest in the industrial policy the Ministry of Trade and Industry and of Agriculture were promoting . But after I left the country , I learnt – via a Facebook post of his – that he was a big fan of the product space model developed by Hausman and Rodrik . He didn ’ t show any interest because the conversation around him by stakeholders such as the IMF , World Bank and his own technicians in the Ministries didn ’ t allow space for it . This appears to be improving today , and some countries such as Ghana are making good headway , although there remains a long way to go .
The second reason is the cause of the first and probably the cause of all the weak technical arguments presented above against industrial policy . African nations and many other LICs / LMICs continue to suffer from an extractive political economy . The global economy has historically – since before colonisation and accelerated exponentially by colonisation – come to engage with many of today ’ s LICs and LMICs in two ways : extracting raw or semi-raw resources from Africa and exporting finished goods back to African nations . The evidence of this is extensive – such as how the British empire dismantled factories in Eritrea and took them to the UK – to the commoditised primary source of exports of many nations , such as copper in Zambia , iron ore in Sierra Leone , oil in Angola and uranium in Niger . Even in countries without major natural mineral resources , trade has been extractive : think of the export of raw coffee from Ethiopia , tea from Kenya and cocoa from Ghana and Cote d ’ Ivoire . And in terms of the exportation of finished goods back to African nations , consider the political power in African capital cities that import traders have : be it of cars , fertiliser , fish , rice , machines and so on . For example , France has over 350 companies in Cote d ’ Ivoire , but few of these are investors in the productive sectors .
Many – probably fairly – argue that it remains in the interest of most high-income countries to maintain this type of extractive and import-based relationship with African nations . Many economic and political strategists in Washington DC , Paris , London and Brussels still argue that they want to retain the value-added benefits in global value chains in their countries . The good news is that some countries , such as China , Netherlands and
Germany , have recognised that it is in their own enlightened self-interest to prioritise investment in factories , value-added agriculture , call centres , value-adding forest economies and tourism in African nations . An increased focus by nations like the US on tech start-ups and telecoms is an important step in the positive direction , although modern tech must be seen as an integral part of industrial policy , not a be-all and end-all , as most of it is at present . Data alone doesn ’ t create jobs and increase foreign exchange and tax revenues at scale unless embedded in the growth of firms on a national scale .
Yet , to change these constraining dynamics and unlock the transformational power of export-led industrial policy across Africa , and thus unleash Africa ’ s true economic and political potential , the drive has to come from African nations . African leaders are increasingly recognising the importance of job creation , export-generation and tax base widening strategies . Beyond the front-runners like Mauritius , Morocco , Botswana , Egypt , Ghana and Ethiopia , others such as Senegal , Rwanda , Tanzania , Cote d ’ Ivoire and Uganda are accelerating their focus on investor-led and export-oriented industrial policy , driven by agencies at the centre of government instead of just letting it lie idle in the Ministries of Industry , Agriculture or Tourism .
It is essential for African nations to continue to build this momentum . The more the 5 key agencies
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