of producers ’ unions of Benin ( FUPRO ) saw an opportunity for its members and therefore engaged in a partnership with SOCIA and SOBEBRA . 2SCALE together with several communal producers ’ unions ( or UCPs ) belonging to FUPRO , engaged in the traceability system , that required coding starting from the production plots , to the producers , villages and municipalities . At the same time , 2SCALE implemented a two-year organisational and managerial capacity strengthening programme for the UCPs , to increase the efficiency of the partnership . Thanks to the intensive support to internal coaches ( members of FUPRO ), the maize producers have now improved the management of their farms and maize productivity . They have more insight into the advantages of collective purchases and sales , and they master negotiation techniques based on production cost calculations as well as techniques to reduce production costs . So , at the level of the farms , there has been quite some improvement .
Differing levels of commitment
However , SOCIA , the initiator of the partnership has not shown the same scale of commitment to the farmers . Indeed , SOCIA hesitated too long to engage in a real production-supply contract with FUPRO , despite 2SCALE ’ s extensive support in a negotiation process . In fact , SOCIA preferred to limit its engagement to develop purchase order letters once the maize was in the FUPRO stores . Also , SOCIA did not want to discuss the demand of the UCPs to obtain credit . It was only after long negotiations that SOCIA finally agreed to a tripartite arrangement with FUPRO and ALIDÉ , the credit provider , committing to purchase maize from FUPRO . The credit from ALIDÉ enabled FUPRO to provide seed and fertilisers to the producers through the UCPs . Although this centralised credit-input regulation was efficient , it did not help to nurture the interactions between the local actors , and the functioning of the nascent ABCs . For this reason , the coaches had difficulties mobilising local credit and input suppliers to rally behind the primary UCPs ; hence , there has never been a real need to develop the local-level clusters for this partnership . After some years of support , the traceability system started to function well . This was marred however by SOBEBRA ’ s growing concern about the high level of aflatoxin in the maize supply . In response to this , 2SCALE successfully trained the producers to control all possible sources of aflatoxin contamination .
The price-setting battle
Still , the real battle had just begun . SOCIA proposed a low 110 CFA francs / kg (€ 0.17 ) at delivery and did not have a real contract with the farmers stipulating the sales price . The farmers of course did not accept this as they had been trained to calculate the production costs ( which amounted on average to 150 CFA francs / kg (€ 0.23 ) and they felt that all the efforts they had made on improving traceability and on aflatoxin control were not being acknowledged . SOCIA and FUPRO then embarked on time-consuming negotiations with the farmers to finally arrive at a sales price of 135 CFA francs / kg (€ 0.21 ). In the meantime , the market price for maize increased to 180 CFA francs / kg (€ 0.27 ) so of course the farmers started to sell their maize on the free market . Fearing a shortfall in their needed maize supply , SOCIA then proposed 150 CFA francs , but at this point this price was not attractive enough for the producers . Finally , only a small quantity of the traced maize has been sold to SOCIA . One out of the eight farmers ’ organisations , the UCP of Glazoué supplied the company with 90 tonnes , while its objective for 2015 had been to supply 2,000 tonnes , and SOCIA had expected a supply of 10,000 tonnes of maize . According to SOCIA and SOBEBRA , the producers betrayed their commitment . However , FUPRO has a different interpretation of what happened , and the organisation denounced several dysfunctions in the negotiation process as well as an inappropriate price-setting mechanism .
Far from an inclusive business model
The major lesson to be learned from this account is that a partnership can only function if all key actors effectively commit themselves to the process at all stages . In this case , the point of view of the producers was not taken seriously enough . If it had been , this would have helped to better integrate the requirements of the partnership , to evaluate whether it was in fact feasible , and for all actors to engage in finding ways to adapt the different quality demands to the reality of the field . It also appears that there was a lack of true and strong commitment on behalf of the two companies , SOCIA and SOBEBRA , toward the inclusive business model , which requires an equal and trusted relationship with the local producers . This means that all parties should be involved in monitoring the process , anticipating difficulties and working together to find credible solutions . This was lacking . Lastly , and related to this last point , a decentralised decision-making process was missing . This should also be part of an inclusive business model . But FUPRO and SOCIA went for a centralised input-credit arrangement that did not encourage the development of agreements with local finance services and input suppliers around the UCPs , and so the agribusiness clusters did not really operationalise .
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 Société béninoise de brasseries . 15 Société des industries alimentaires . 16 Fédération des unions des producteurs . 17 Union communale des producteurs .
18 Association de lutte pour la promotion des initiatives de développement .
19 Aflatoxin : poisonous and cancer-causing chemicals that are produced by certain moulds ( Aspergillus flavus and Aspergillus parasiticus ) which grow in soil , decaying vegetation , hay , and grains such as maize .
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