Can a Good Case for the Censorship of Pornography be Made Using Austin ' s Speech-Act Theory ?
CHERISH GWYNN
In a lecture given at Harvard in 1955 , British philosopher J . L . Austin addressed his frustration with the tendency in philosophy of language to overlook how statements can be actions , rather than just descriptions or facts . This frustration was the starting point for his series of lectures entitled ‘ How To Do Things With Words ’, where he outlined his speech act theory , giving examples such as marriage and making a promise to show how in saying something , we can indeed do something ( Austin , 1975 ). Perhaps one of the most unusual examples of this idea is pornography , which is classified as a type of speech within free speech legislation which protects the right to distribute and consume it ( Langton , 1993 ).
In the US , where feminist lawyer Catherine Mackinnon made her case for a change in pornography laws , pornography is protected specifically by the first amendment right to free speech . Alongside renowned feminist activist Andrea Dworkin , Mackinnon defined pornography as ‘ the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects , things , or commodities ; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape ; being tied up , cut up , mutilated , bruised , or physically hurt ; in postures of sexual submission or servility or display ; reduced to body parts , penetrated by objects or animals , or presented in scenarios of degradation , injury , torture ; shown as filthy or inferior ; bleeding , bruised , or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual ’ ( Mackinnon , 1989 , pp . 176 ). This definition is supported by analyses of online pornography which show at
least 1 in every 3 pornography videos depicts sexual violence / aggression and that this was against women 97 % of the time ( Fritz et al , 2020 ). If we look carefully at the wording used in this definition , we can see how it links to Austin ’ s theory of speech acts . They define pornography , which in law is defined as a type of speech , as the act of subordination of women , this echoes Austin sentiment that saying something can be doing something .
This connection between two unlikely counterparts forms the basis of Rae Langton ’ s philosophical defence of Mackinnon ’ s argument in her article ‘ Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts ’ ( 1993 ). In this article , Langton addresses two central claims made by feminists against pornography . Firstly , that pornography subordinates ’ women and secondly that pornography silences women ( Langton , 1993 , pp . 5 ). Langton successfully uses Austin ’ s speechact theory to defend both of these claims , which in turn can be used to argue for censorship of pornography . However , empirical support for the link between censoring pornography and an increase in liberty and equality for women is also needed if a truly compelling case for censorship of pornography is to be achieved .
Before assessing whether speech-act theory makes a good case for censorship of pornography , we need to have a good understanding of the theory itself . Austin ’ s main concern was the illocutionary act , which is to be distinguished from the locutionary and perlocutionary acts . A locutionary act is simply the utterance of a phrase , it is the act of using
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