2016: The Year in Review | Page 25

twice the size of the American economy – and larger than the US and European economy combined. Welcome to a very different future. And China’s impact will not simply be economic. Just as China will transform the world economically it will have a similar impact politically and culturally. But this will take longer. There was a time lag between Britain’s Industrial Revolution and its later huge political and military power – as expressed for example in its burgeoning empire – in the second half of the nineteenth century. Likewise America possessed the world’s largest economy by around 1900 but it was not until after 1945 that it became the dominant global power and began to shape the world and its values in a way that we are familiar with today. We can expect the same time delay with China. It probably won’t be obvious until the second half of this century that the world is becoming increasingly Chinese rather than Western. At present there is a widespread assumption that as China modernises it will become a replica of the West. But modernity is not just a product of markets, competition and technology: it is equally a function of history and culture. And China’s history and culture are profoundly different from those of the West. China has never been like the West and never will be. True, it has been learning much from the West, and this process will continue, but it will, nonetheless, remain very distinctive. Indeed, one of the great difficulties that the West will face is trying to understand China. Hitherto, it has largely tried to make sense of China in Western terms using concepts derived from Western experience. This in large measure explains why Western predictions about China, not least about its economic performance, have been so frequently wrong. We will find in the future, however, that we have no choice other than to understand China in its own terms. This will be a huge challenge to the West that is likely to occupy us for most of this century. Let us take a couple of examples. Although China has called itself a nation- state for over a century, in reality it is primarily a civilization-state. China, of course, is not a century old but more like two thousand years old. So the experience of being a nation-state is very recent and extremely brief. The Chinese sense of whom they are and what China is, comes not from the last century but overwhelmingly from the previous two millennia when China was a civilization- state. A pictographic language, Confucian values, a very distinctive notion of the state and the family, Chinese food and medicine, ancestral worship and suchlike date back many centuries and often millennia. The outlook of Westerners is largely shaped by a sense of national identity; the Chinese, in contrast, are fundamentally moulded by their notion of civilization. The implications of this difference are multifarious and profound. Or take the question of governance. It is overwhelmingly assumed in the West that the legitimacy of government is a function of Western-style democracy. On this basis, the Chinese state is clearly bereft of legitimacy. Yet there is much evidence to suggest that the Chinese state in fact enjoys considerable legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese. Clearly the reason is not Western-style democracy; so what is the explanation? The Chinese see the state as the embodiment of their civilization and its key task as preserving the unity of that civilization. Unlike in the West, furthermore, where the government is seen in utilitarian and instrumentalist terms – ‘what will it do for me?’ – in China, as in many other East Asian societies, especially those derived from Confucianism, the state is seen in familial terms, as, in effect, the parent (traditionally, the father). This is totally different from Western ways of thinking. Finally, the Chinese lay great importance on the competence of the state and its officials, and on meritocratic selection. This is a very old tradition that go es back more than two millennia. There is no question that the Chinese state is by and large far more competent than its Western counterparts, especially given it is still a developing country. Just these two examples illustrate the profound difference between Western and Chinese traditions. In this light it is not 25