From
to
bullets ballots
EtC: In the context of post-conflict
peacebuilding, elections are considered an
essential political solution to violent conflict
and a basis for a durable peace. However, in
some countries elections did not contribute
to a democratic state nor peace building but
rather rekindled conflicts (for example, in
Burundi in 1993, Togo in 2005 or more recently
in Iraq or Egypt). Why? What are the elements
and circumstances that can lead to further
conflict during and after elections in postconflict countries?
SV: I think that there is no general answer. Each
case requires a thorough understanding of what
went wrong and what was successful in the
particular circumstances – which already is one
lesson learned. We can promote the general idea
of the elections but
when it comes down to
operationalizing that idea
in a particular context,
we should allow for some
flexibility, both in the
institutional translation
as well as in the power
politics behind it.
cannot ensure independence from any political
interference, the credibility of the elections will
always be questioned. Timelines are often totally
unrealistic. In the recent past, elections were held
in Libya and Egypt but I don’t think those countries
are better off today. So yes, you can have elections
but if the necessary ingredients for democracy
are not present it will not bring a sustainable
democracy.
EtC: But if we wouldn’t follow these unrealistic
timelines and we would postpone elections,
meanwhile, what do you do?
AB: I am not saying that we should always wait. It
is not morally acceptable to prevent people that
want to choose their leaders to have elections
only because systems are not ready. If we look
at elections across the world, we can always find
fraud. The issue is not always waiting or not. In
a hundred years, we won’t have everything in
place to have the perfect elections. It is up to the
international community and local people to make
the judgemen t of when people will vote.
SV: What we often see
happening on the ground
is power-sharing, i.e.
negotiated settlement
resulting in some kind of
intermediate government
with political and military
power-sharing involved.
Now there are many con’s
and some pro’s for the use
of power-sharing in the
immediate aftermath. Its
main benefits – at least
to short term stability – are sharing the cake among
elites, negotiating quota, etc. But of course, that’s
just postponing the real matter which is about
building a credible, accountable, legitimate public
authority. So power-sharing is a temporary measure
which has some benefits but, at the same time, it
can send a disastrous signal, that is: as long as you
use violence and you are sufficiently successful, you
can negotiate yourself into power, irrespective of
what people really want. For example, in Kenya and
Zimbabwe power-sharing was used as a temporary
response and advocated by the African Union after
failed elections or contested elections. When in
2010 the opposition was about to lose the elections
in Burundi, it immediately referred to Kenya and
Zimbabwe and said ‘let’s negotiate, let’s establish
a government of national utility’. What we see is
that the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe had sent the
wrong signal and had become a model. Fortunately,
the African Union now resists the temptation of
power-sharing in situations in which elections are
contested. But again it’s about balancing between
The role of democratic
elections in peace
building and state
building processes.
Who?
Andrew Bradley is the Director of the Office of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)
to the EU in Brussels, Belgium. He was previously the Assistant
Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Human Development of
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. He has also
served as a diplomat in various positions, including Deputy Director,
First Secretary and Counsellor South African Department of Foreign
Affairs, Pretoria, Brussels, Geneva and Ottawa.
Stef Vandeginste is a lecturer at the Institute of Development Policy
and Management (IOB). His research interests include political transitions, peace negotiations, power-sharing, transitional justice and
human rights, with a geographical focus on Sub-Sahara Africa and
Burundi in particular.
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AB: There is a tendency
to think that elections
will solve everything.
Elections are an important first step but the
examples you mentioned show a tendency to
sometimes rush into elections. It is a very delicate
balance between whether the time is right to hold
elections or if it is perhaps better to wait a bit. It is
very situational and context-specific.
EtC: What about the role of the international
community?
AB: The international community needs to play
a role in post-conflict situations but the most
important is what do people want. Democracy
cannot be exported, but grows from within.
Democracy is also a process. One first needs
to make sure that the political environment
is conducive for elections. The timing of the
elections in a post-conflict state is also linked with
sequencing, i.e. what are the steps: will there first
be presidential elections or assembly elections?
Then, the mechanisms of the process: how well
is the elections’ management body equipped? If
the elections are not well administered and if they
using power-sharing where it’s the only temporary
alternative and not too strongly advocating the
model.
EtC: Are there solutions/processes other than
elections that can lead to the sustainable
maintenance of peace?
SV: Honestly, I don’t see any real alternatives
to elections. What has been done - increasingly
successfully - are “guided elections”, i.e. elections
that take place within a certain preset format.
You can, for instance, design your electoral
system in such a way that there is a guaranteed
representation of certain groups. So, you build
in certain levels of representation irrespective of
what the elections bring as a result. In Belgium we
are quite familiar with things such as proportional
representation and guaranteed representation
of minorities. They are put in place to soften the
potentially destabilizing effects that elections can
have.
EtC: And this is not what happened in Burundi?
SV: That was one of the problems in Burundi in
1993 when all of a sudden, part of the outgoing
elites realized that after the elections there was no
guarantee of a strong political survival. Then they
staged a coup d’état shortly after the elections
which they had lost. Today, the elections in this
country don’t have that kind of revolutionary effect
anymore: whatever the outcome of the election
looks like, part of the old elites still remains in
power.
EtC: In Rwanda, Paul Kagame has been the
country’s President since 1994. He is credited
with leading a remarkable recovery from war
and genocide, in economic terms but also in
terms of peace-building. Although Rwanda
is officially a democracy where elections are
regularly held, in fact, the President is seen
by many as a dictator not only because he has
been in power for 20 years and aggressively
bars most opposition parties from
participating in elections but also because
he is considered responsible for many human
rights abuses and for the deaths of several
investigators, journalists and opposition
politicians. Is a dictatorship sometimes a
better option than liberal democracy in order
to maintain peace and stability?
AB: First of all, Kagame cannot run for presidency
again according to the constitution. At the end
of the day, I think the constitution provides the
framework to have the rule of law functioning,
which is a part of the democracy plate. In Rwanda,
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