13th European Conference on eGovernment – ECEG 2013 1 | Page 570

Konrad Walser

tions. There appear to be huge gaps between the department leadership( minister / department level) and the head of the bureau which cannot be overcome, and corruption and abuse of authority can remain unpunished for many years. This is of considerable concern with regard to missing CaB mechanisms.

The various aspects mentioned can also be addressed starting from the project controls from COBIT 4.1( cf. Figure 2). Aspects from the case study presented here are added to the relevant controls in the form of comments. The specialist departments( and external inspection authorities) are presented in the same way as the actual organisational units of the FMF. The analysis of the relationships between the parties involved in the FMF analogous to Figure 2 is as follows: analysis of the relationship FMF management ‐ FTA management: the authorities in the department have always had a certain independence. There is no tight leadership via central IT control by the general secretary office( it has few employees although it is a large department) to which IT management was delegated and / or handed over. The director of the department( minister) also changed three times during the project. This also applies to the general secretaries. None of this was conducive to tight leadership in the area of IT and confirmed, among other things, Mertens ' theory( 2008) referred to earlier in the article. Only the current department head took the information from external inspectors seriously and acted( cf. Volksblatt 2012). It highlighted that the relationship between the new department head and the head of the bureau was poor because conformance on procurement practices was not achievable via directives. Not much can be said about an analysis of the relationship FMF management – FMF finance department. However, it is almost certain that no business case was created and more importantly enforced. As stipulated in this article, an appropriate code of practice is very uncommon in administrative practice as is the absorption of resource benefits from projects.

General secretariat, EFK, Findel, etc.

Monitoring of positioned COBIT controls for project management: did not function internally, possibly because of concealment.

Federal Ministery of Finance( FMF) management

• Program Management Framework: does not exist

• Stakeholder Commitment: partly available •( Project Scope Statement): HERMES documentation •( Project Risk Assessment): HERMES documentation, unclear •( Project Change Control): inadequate •( Project Performance Monitoring): inadequate

Figure 2: Annotation of the controls per COBIT 4.1 based on quoted sources and using developed project governance models( CaB); HERMES denotes the project management method of the Swiss Confederation)

Analysis of the relationship FMF management ‐ project management: for hierarchical reasons, a direct relationship is not present, desired or permitted. This is typical within administration. It is not known whether internal whistle‐blowers from the project contacted the department management. However, based on the various reports from whistle‐blowers relating to Insieme that were released to the press, it can be assumed that such contact could have been made( rub 2012). Analysis of the relationship project management and parties involved in the project: the project management was composed of professionals with little idea about IT but very good specialist knowledge. Parties involved in the project are partly external IT specialists. This meant that project management, sub‐project management and project employees had a poor relationship with each other which had direct influence on the business IT alignment problem. Analysis of the relationship FMFmanagement ‐ FTA management: apart from the regular resource conferences about the FMF as a whole, no specific comments are made based in the aforementioned quoted sources on the relationship between

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