Klaus Stranacher et al.
Table 1: Technical assessment of examined sanitizable signature schemes
Signatur e Scheme Ateniese et al.( 2005) Canard and Jambert( 2010) Klonows ki and Lauks( 2006) Slamani g and Hanser( 2013)
6. Conclusions
Design. Redactor
Privacy
Design. Parts
Accountability
Applicable to Structured Data
Compatibility
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comment
No security model and no proofs are given
The emerging trend to make public sector data available to the general public and to the corporate sector raises the demand for innovative techniques to meet arising security requirements. Electronic signatures in general and redactable electronic signature schemes in particular have recently been proposed as adequate enabler for such security preserving techniques.
In this paper we have made the next step towards a concrete implementation of these techniques by evaluating different proposed schemes for redactable signatures and by assessing their capabilities to enhance the security of publishing( anonymized) public sector data. The assessment has been based on a set of legal, organisational, and technical requirements, which have previously been defined and discussed. The conducted assessment of existing redactable signature schemes has revealed that especially sanitizable signature schemes, which represent a subset of redactable signatures schemes, are well suited to enhance the security of published public sector data. Among the set of evaluated sanitizable signature schemes, especially two schemes proposed by Canard and Jambert( 2010) and by Slamanig and Hanser( 2013) have turned out to be able to meet given legal, organisational, and technical requirements.
The results that have been obtained from the conducted assessment pave the way for several future activities in this field. In a next step, the two most promising schemes that have been identified by the conducted assessment will be implemented and integrated into approved electronic signature schemes such as XMLDSIG. This implementation will then serve as basis for the development of solutions based on trusted and reliable public sector data.
References
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9 This scheme supports accountability only for the version where accumulators are used. In case the bloom filter is used accountability is no achievable.
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