as the obligation to create a common operational will . But most significantly , it was because compliance with its rules would have required monetary measures to be accompanied by a strong economic policy for the Communities and appropriate sectoral , regional and social policies of solidarity and recovery .
Its creation should have meant that the Communities – the Commission , the Council , Parliament , the national governments and parliaments , the central banks , the economic think-tanks – should have restarted the work on the economic and monetary union that had begun with the Werner Report but that had been hastily and irresponsibly shelved seven years earlier .
Its creation should have meant the transition to a definitive system with a monetary fund endowed with its own resources and a parallel real currency . However , beyond that , it should have meant a thorough re-examination of all Community policies linked to three main fields of action : ( i ) the new budget revenues and the budgetary powers of the European Parliament that would be elected in that year ; ( ii ) the renewal of the Lomé Agreements , addressing the Communities ’ relations with Africa in particular and the fight against hunger in the world ; ( iii ) the enlargement of the Communities to include countries of southern Europe and the consequences of this on agricultural and regional policy .
Closely linked to policies was the issue of the governance of the European economy , i . e . politics . The actions of governments were aimed at depleting the powers of the Commission and besieging Parliament – the ‘ citadel of European democracy ’ – even before it was elected by universal and direct suffrage , while the actions of Parliament were aimed at breaking through the siege and creating the conditions for a new balance between the institutions and the Member States .
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