The Council did not implement the convention or the other proposals that the Assembly subsequently voted on because , for a long time , the governments and the prevailing doctrine supported the grotesque idea that a parliament without powers could not be elected by universal suffrage . At the same time , they supported the idea that no powers could be given to a parliament that was not representative of the vote of the citizens .
Despite the fact that it was not elected by universal and direct suffrage , and despite the letter of the Treaties , the European Parliament gradually gained some supranational powers in budgetary matters . In 1970 , it was given the power to reject the draft budget prepared by the governments based on the proposal from the Commission . In 1975 , it exercised this power again , following the Council ’ s recommendation to use a value added tax to finance the European budget . Parliament also gained the power to table amendments on so-called non-compulsory expenditure ( i . e . all except agricultural expenditure ), based on the principle of ‘ no taxation without representation ’.
As a logical accompaniment to the new budgetary powers , a conciliation procedure was introduced , i . e . an embryonic codecision procedure or legislative dialogue concerning ‘ acts of general scope with important financial implications ’, that later formed the basis of the trilogue process between the Commission , the Council and Parliament .
These steps forward had two effects , offering institutional potentials that were realised in the first legislative term of the Parliament elected in June 1979 .
The first potential concerns regional policy , which , since the 1970s , had progressively become an essential part of the European
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