it , and Parliament also has the right to block individual delegated acts adopted by the Commission .
Similarly , Parliament ’ s relationship with the Commission was modified step by step . The Treaty of Maastricht changed the Commission ’ s term of office to five years to coincide with that of Parliament . A new Commission would be appointed straight after each parliamentary election , with Parliament consulted on the choice of President and holding a binding vote to approve or reject the Commission as a whole . Amsterdam changed the consultative vote on the President into a binding one and gave the President a right to choose other Commissioners jointly with national governments . Nice gave the President the power to appoint Vice-Presidents , and to dismiss individual Commissioners ( for instance , if Parliament called for that ). It also introduced QMV for the European Council ’ s decision on who to propose for President , eliminating national vetoes . Lisbon required the European Council to take into account the European election results when deciding who to propose to Parliament as President of the Commission . It described Parliament ’ s vote on the nominee as an election ; it was not merely a seal of approval on a decision taken elsewhere , but the key point of the process .
These changes strengthened perceptions of the Commission as a political executive needing the support of a parliamentary majority . It might be a relatively weak executive , since it is faced with a bicameral legislature that it does not control through compliant majorities , has limited areas of responsibility , and inevitably is a coalition in party-political terms . However , it is undoubtedly an executive ; it is charged with carrying out agreed policies , endowed with the right of legislative initiative , responsible for executing the budget , and it employs the bulk of EU civil servants . The fact that , from that point onwards , neither its President , nor the Commis-
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